**Forskningssammanställning – kritik mot Huskurage (dec 17)**

**Breul, N. & Keith, M. Deadly Calls and Fatal Encounters – Analysis of U.S. law enforcement line of duty deaths when officers responded to dispatched calls for service and conducted enforcement (2010-2014). Hämtad 2017-11-30 från:** [**http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/officer-safety/Primary\_Research\_Final\_11-0\_updated\_8\_31\_16.pdf**](http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/officer-safety/Primary_Research_Final_11-0_updated_8_31_16.pdf)

* Some key findings from this report reveal that calls related to domestic disputes and domestic- related incidents represented the highest number of fatal types of calls for service and were also the underlying cause of law enforcement fatalities for several other calls for service. (s. 4)
* Based on the results of the analysis of these fatal incidents, it is clear that agencies must strive to improve the information sharing between dispatchers and all responding officers. Better information regarding the location and its call history, as well as any other details of the call, must be made readily available. (s. 5)
* Agency personnel should also ensure that domestic violence/disturbance cases are monitored closely and that dispatchers inquire about an officer’s welfare regularly when they are on the scene of a high priority call. (s. 5)
* There were 91 cases identified that involved a call for service. Researchers divided those cases into categories according to the classification or nature of the call. For example, the Burglary and Robbery calls were divided into separate categories, as were the Domestic Dispute calls, Disturbance calls, and so on. Calls for officers to respond to a complaint of a Domestic Dispute or domestic-related incident represented the largest single group. The details from the study of these 20 cases highlight the potential areas of concern where responding officers had been placed or placed themselves in dangerous situations.
* Some of the case studies presented are examples of how fast situations can turn deadly, and despite receiving the best information and deploying the correct approach, tragedy can still occur.
* As most law enforcement officers have been informed during their training or know intuitively from working the streets, and as this data supports, Domestic Dispute calls, or intra-family offenses, were the most dangerous type of call for the responding officers. (s 15)
* The topic of officers handling calls for service alone is a major theme throughout our analysis of all the calls for service. As illustrated in Figure 3, 35 percent of the officers killed while responding to Domestic Dispute calls were alone. The necessity of having three or more officers at a domestic situation to adequately separate parties, monitor family members and, if necessary, physically restrain and arrest a suspect, is apparent. As this study found, even in the situations where two officers were present, domestic violence calls had the potential of turning deadly. (s. 16)
* The need and use of coordinated information before handling a domestic-related call is critical. Sharing information and discussing a plan of approach is important so that officers act together with the same set of facts. (s 17)
* The importance of call history, accurate information, and suspect descriptions cannot be overstated, as in two of the cases examined researchers found that misinformation led to an officer being unaware they were stopping an armed suspect. The crucial nature of obtaining, relaying, and taking action on call information as safely as possible is a key finding from the data analyzed. (s 17)
* This notion ties directly to the current trend towards providing patrol officers enhanced information, direct access to call details, and providing criminal databases at their fingertips. The move towards intelligence-led policing and the use of technology and social media are components of a safer and more methodical approach to handling volatile domestic-related cases. (s 17)
* Se även s. 19-20 ”red flags and recommendations”
* Calls involving a domestic disturbance or domestic-related assault were not only the most dangerous type of call for service, but they were also the underlying cause in other fatal calls for service analyzed in this report. (s 46)
* The raw emotions that are part of domestic relationships present a constant danger to officers who are summoned to investigate a dispute or assault. The case analysis has shown that these emotions are also often fueled by substance abuse, and the police quickly became the focal point of a suspect’s anger, particularly when they attempt to take family members into custody. (s 46)
* This report has concluded that having two or more officers on the scene of a call for service is safer and provides the additional support needed if a fatal encounter occurs. The researchers are not emphasizing two-man patrols but believe there is inherent safety of having multiple officers on the scene of those calls for service that are potentially dangerous and violent. (s 67)
* This study, despite there being no statistical demonstration that two officers on a scene are less likely to sustain fatal assaults compared to just one, demonstrates that when there are multiple officers on the scene, particularly on domestic-related calls, the number of fatal assaults drops. (s 67)
* Analysis of the NELOMF fatality data shows that domestic-related calls for service resulted in 22 percent of officer fatalities within the five year study period; more than any other type of call. The research further found that domestic-related disputes were the underlying cause in other calls for service not initially dispatched as domestic-related. (s 67)
* Leadership, solid training, and clear policy are the foundation on which many of the outlined recommendations can be achieved and future repetition of these cases be prevented. (s 68)
* Calls related to domestic disputes and domestic-related incidents represented the highest number of fatal types of calls for service and were also the underlying cause of several other calls for service that resulted in law enforcement fatalities. (s 70)
* Thirty-four percent of the officers killed in the study of calls for service were alone when they were assaulted. In 12 of those cases, officers had been dispatched alone. (s 70)
* Greater emphasis should be placed on the need for two officers to respond to calls for service and that officers should wait for the secondary unit or the backup assistance they requested before acting. (s 72)
* Improve communications and information-sharing for officers on the street who are responding to calls for service. Call history, warrants and arrest history for the location and any previously identified mental health issues should be readily available. (s 72)

**Lichtenberg, I.D., & Smith, A. 2001. ”How dangerous are routine police-citizen traffic stops? A research note”. Journal of Criminal Justice, 29, pp. 419-428.**

* A study done by Hirschel et al. (1994) and Uchida and Brooks (1988) examined the relative danger of a variety of ”calls to the police”.
* When examining ”index offenses” and assaults, they found the following four out of ten activities to be more dangerous than responding to a traffic incident: domestics (and disturbances, robbery, sex offenses).
* When examining detailed circumstances at the scene and assaults, domestics were once again considered more dangerous.

**Wilson, S., & Zhao, J. (2008). ”Determining the correlates of police victimization: An analysis of organizational level factors on injurious assaults”. Journal of Criminal Justice, 36, pp. 461–468.**

* Literature review: ”research set out to find the most dangerous calls for service that the police respond to (…) observed that domestic calls were less likely than general disturbance calls to result in assaults to officers, but more likely to result in injuries.”
* ”They pointed out that ”legal interventions” were the most dangerous incidents, followed by alcohol problems, domestic calls, and general disturbances.”
* *Interesting note in this research piece*: the authors also discuss differing policing strategies that could work to lower the rates of assault on officers and their arguments suggest that departments that engage in community policing should have lower rates of injurious assaults.
* One recent study found that making arrests had the largest effect on risk of assaults, increasing the chance of victimization against police officers by 60%.
* ”Additionally, evidence suggests that aggressiveness may anger individuals who perceive that the police are illegitimately exercising their authority.”
* ”Research findings suggest that nonlethal weapons utilized by police can prevent injuries to officers. When available, these weapons can quickly incapacitate resisting suspects so that officers do not have to resort to physical, hands on means to handle violent encounters.”  
  *(Kommentar: Hur ska grannar (s.k. bystanders) utan ex. pepparspray kunna skydda sig effektivt mot en förövare om en situation uppstår där de hamnar i en hotfull situation genom sitt agerande?)*

**Brandl, S.G. 1996. ”In the line of duty: A descriptive analysis of police assaults and accidents”. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24(3), pp. 255–264.**

* (This text talks about felonious assault and murder of police officers and this information comes from FBI annual data).
* ”Most of the homicides (on police officers) occurred in arrest situations (crimes in progress and pursuing suspects; 42 percent) and during disturbance calls (bar fights, man with gun, family quarrels; 18% of all killings).”
* Most assault occurred in disturbance situations (32%) including domestic calls.
* “One of the primary purposes of studies that have examined assaults and homicide of police officers is to identify high risk or dangerous activities. If these tasks can be identified, the reasoning goes, then policies can be developed and training can be provided to reduce the frequency of such incidents. For example, Hirschel, Dean, and Lumb (1994) suggest that two or more officers be dispatched to handle domestic disturbance situations (as they found assaults to occur less often when more than one officer was present), that officers be required to complete in-service training in crisis intervention and cultural awareness, and that officers be provided with more accurate and detailed information about calls for service before they are actually in the situation. According to Konstantin (1984), police training should emphasize techniques of handling routine arrests and responding to robberies as much as methods of resolving domestic disturbances”.  
  *(Kommentar: Baserat på denna information – återigen; hur ska grannar kunna agera enligt Huskurages råd när poliser behöver extra kunskap och extra träning innan de ingriper?)*

**Johnson, R.R. 2011. “Predicting officer physical assaults at domestic assault calls”. Journal of Family Violence, 26, pp. 163-169.**

* Domestic assault calls are one source of assaults on officers; inability to accurately predict what circumstances might lead to an attack is one cause of officer cynicism and paranoia.
* Having the ability to identify which suspects pose the greatest threat of assault would allow officers to take appropriate protective measures.
* Findings: five significant batterer characteristics (employment status, shared residence with abuse victim, alcohol consumption, property damage, and hostile demeanor toward officers) that successfully predicted officer assaults – these risk factors may be incorporated into police safety training in the response to family violence calls.
* Studies in different communities have suggested that domestic assault calls are one of the three most common situations where officer assaults occur.
* FBI statistics indicate that from 1980 to 2003 more than 224 000 police officers in the U.S. were assaulted while handling family disturbance calls.
* While survival rate for officers assaulted in the U.S. has been steadily increasing over the last 30 years, the survival rate for officers assaulted at domestic violence calls has failed to increase for officers assaulted at domestic assault calls.
* It is the *unpredictability* and constant *potential* for danger in the form of a violent physical attack that distinguishes the work environment of the police officer – therefore, increasing an officer’s ability to predict which domestic assault situations pose the highest potential for assault could be very helpful (this would allow officers to take protective measures).  
  *(Kommentar: Om det redan för en tränad polis är svårt att kunna avgöra hur en situation ser ut, hur ska då en otränad granne förväntas kunna avgöra detta på egen hand utan att utsättas för stora risker?)*
* Characteristics in all law enforcement officer murders reported to the FBI (for the U.S.): findings suggest that majority of the assailants are young (15-29) males, members of racial minority groups, unemployed, low SES, unmarried, under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, and had a criminal record.
* In the U.K.: the assailants were found to be predominantly lower income males who were unemployed, had a criminal record, and were consuming alcohol at the time of the assault. Most were between ages of 17 and 25, with an average of 22 y/o.
* Same results were found in Australia and Iceland.
* Weaknesses of these findings: they all failed to make any attempt to predict officer assaults; while the “typical assailant” has been described above, not all people with these characteristics end up assaulting officers, so how do the assailants differ from the non-assailants that officers typically encounter(?); another weakness is an assumption that all assault incidents are similar.  
  *(Kommentar: Återigen är det väldigt svårt att avgöra, även för den mest kunnige, hur man ska agera i hotfulla situationer och speciellt i situationer som handlar om våld i hemmet – alla situationer ter sig olika, och att då lägga ansvaret på en otränad granne att göra en säker riskbedömning för att sedan ingripa ter väldigt naivt och ansvarslöst (både för dennes och andras säkerhet)).*
* Empirical evidence suggests that assaults on officers at domestic calls, and officer survival rates from these assaults, have remained stable for more than 30 years – there is little likelihood that any possible changes in police tactics since the 1980’s has occurred with respect to handling domestic calls.
* When offenders are surprised by the appearance of the police they might be more likely to resist or be antagonistic toward the officers.
* Research results in this paper suggests that domestic assault calls are not necessarily frequent events. Nevertheless, due to the sheer volume of domestic assault calls handled by the police in the U.S., there is still a significant risk of assault.
* Following five points are risk factors/characteristics of batterers to take into account in domestic calls:
* (1) when the suspect displayed a hostile demeanor toward the police, the batterer was almost 13 times more likely to assault the officers than if he did not display a hostile demeanor.

*(Kommentar: Om grannar ingriper och inte kan avgöra hur pass allvarlig situationen är – hur ska de skydda sig om förövaren reagerar genom att ta ut sin aggression på dem, eller går tillbaka in i lägenheten och agerar ännu våldsammare mot sitt offer?)*

* (2) batterers who had been consuming alcohol were 5 ½ times more likely to assault officers than those who had not.

*(Kommentar: Om grannar inte känner till om förövaren är påverkad, vilket kan vara svårt att avgöra bakom stängda dörrar, hur ska de då kunna skydda sig när/om de knackar på och förövaren öppnar dörren medan de står kvar där?)*

* (3) if the batterer shared a residence with the victim he was more than three times more likely to physically assault the police.
* (4) batterers who had reportedly damaged property during the domestic incident were almost twice as likely to assault officers as those who had not damaged property.  
  *(Kommentar: Om vi utgår ifrån att polisen vet om alla dessa riskfaktorer, hur ska en granne ha vetskap om detta och därefter kunna göra en säker riskbedömning innan de ingriper? Bör man inte lära ut dessa faktorer när man väljer att implementera Huskurage i ett bostadshus, för allas säkerhet?)*
* (5) batterers who were unemployed were about one and a half times more likely to assault police officers than those who were employed.
* It appears that simultaneous presence of all five of these predictors increases the chances of an officer being assaulted to better than one in four, while the absence of all of these predictors reduces the chances of assault to less than one in 263.

*(Kommentar: Om igen, om inte grannarna har denna kunskap, hur ska de då kunna ta rätt beslut angående när och hur de bäst ska ingripa?)*

* Batterers who remain hostile in their demeanor even after the police arrive appear likely to let their hostility turn to physical violence against the officers  
  *(Kommentar: Skulle lika gärna kunna vara grannarna? Och de har dessutom inte tillgång till vapen att försvara sig med, ex. pepparspray eller tjänstevapen)*
* Alcohol serves as a depressant, contributing to the batterer’s negative mood, and may reduce the batterer’s inhibitions about using force against the police *(Kommentar: eller grannar som kliver emellan…).* Alcohol consumption frequently coexists with domestic violence and appears to increase the likelihood of the batterer assaulting the responding police officers *(…eller grannar…).*
* Batterers who reside with their abuse victim are more likely to assault officers than those who live apart from their victim – this may be due to impressions of territorial control.
* Batterers are threatened when they cannot successfully control the behavior of their intimate partners, and appear to be even more threatened when the police enter their home and interject themselves into the situation *(…gäller även grannar?).*
* While this police interference may be difficult for the batterer to accept at any location, it appears to be an even stronger insult when it occurs in his own residence.
* It may also be this emphasis on dominance, power and control that results in unemployed batterers being more likely to assault officers than batterers who are employed.  
  *(Kommentar: When unemployed, the only part of your life that you feel like you are in control over might very well be your family, and when this control is about to slip out of your hands, you suddenly have nothing to lose if you want to keep this control – which in turn would increase the likelihood of a “fight” rather than a “flight” response toward outside intervention… Being employed, you have more to lose and thus you are less likely to make the situation worse than it already is.)*
* Female victims and female batterers in domestic assault situations assault the police only very rarely.
* Certain officer characteristics (such as skills in interpersonal communication), or situational characteristics (such as the number of backup officers present) may help further reduce the odds of being assaulted.

*(Kommentar: Här pratar vi om tränade/kunniga poliser som behöver backup – vad händer då med otränade/okunniga grannar som själva eller tillsammans kliver in?).*

* **If the batterer appears to have any of these five characteristics, the responding officers could possibly be warned of this fact prior to their arrival. Policies should also be developed to send more backup units than normally would be sent if it is determined that the batterer has most of these characteristics.** *(Kommentar: Alltså bör grannar få vetskap när Huskurage implementeras i deras bostadshus om vilka riskfaktorer man ska kolla efter vid en situation som handlar om våld i hemmet, för att sedan ringa polisen och redogöra på ett så bra sätt som möjligt exakt hur situationen ser ut – då kan polisen göra ett så bra jobb som möjligt eftersom de innehar de bästa verktygen för uppdraget, och grannarna kan vara säkra och känna att de gjort allt de kan för att ta hand om situationen på bästa sätt).*

**LEOKA: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (an FBI measure) in 2016**

* **Officers feloniously killed:** Circumstances: during 2016, 13 officers who died had responded to disturbance calls; 7 of these were in response to domestic disturbance calls.
* **Officers assaulted:** Circumstances, of all officers who were assaulted in 2016 (in first place), 32.2% were responding to disturbance calls; these include family quarrels, bar fights etc.)
* **Search LEOKA on Google to find this data.**

**Rabe-Hemp, C.E., & Schuck, A.M. 2007. ”Violence against police officers”. Police Quarterly, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 411–428.**

* “Violence against officers is an important topic not only because of the negative consequences to the officer but also because it is at the core of one of the most debated issues regarding female officers—their ability to deal with hostile citizens. Using arrest data from several metropolitan departments, the research compared gender differences in assaults on officers, as well as situational and individual officer factors related to the assaults. The findings suggest that when compared to male officers, female officers are at an increased risk for being assaulted in family conflict situations. Furthermore, the results suggest that female officers are at the greatest risk of being assaulted in family conflict situations when the assailant is impaired. More research is needed to better understand why family conflict situations and intoxicated assailants are especially dangerous for female officers and what policies can be instituted to mitigate this potentially threatening situation.” *(Kommentar: Denna forskning visar alltså att kvinnliga poliser löper större risk att utsättas för våld* *när de ingriper i situationer med våld I hemmet; även fast de har adekvat träning och tillgång till tjänstevapen m.m. >> hur ska då en kvinnlig person boende I ett hyreshus – utan träning och tillgång till verktyg att skydda sig – kunna ingripa på ett säkert sätt? Forskning visar alltså å ena sidan är kvinnor mer benägna att ingripa, å andra sidan löper kvinnor större risk att skadas vid ett ingripande (kvinnor upplever ofta situationer som mer hotfulla än män, och känner därmed ett större personligt ansvar för att ingripa i jämförelse med män som inte ingriper lika ofta).*

**Sammanfattning**

*När man implementerar Huskurage är det bättre att istället uppmana grannar att ringa till polisen direkt eftersom polisen har adekvat utbildning och vet bäst hur en sådan krissituation ska hanteras. Istället för att lära grannar att “knacka på” är det bättre att man lär ut vilka faktorer som är viktiga att ha i åtanke när man gör en bedömning av hur pass allvarlig en pågående situation är, och att I första hand ringa polisen och redogöra för händelseförloppet så detaljerat som möjligt: ex. Vem är grannen? Hur gammal är han? Bor förövaren med sin partner permanent? Är förövaren arbetslös? Hör man om saker slås sönder i lägenheten? Etcetera… Det finns en stor fara med att grannar vaggas in i en felaktig föreställning där de tror att våld i hemmet kan lösas med en enkel knackning på dörren (krasst sagt). Men all ovanstående forskning pekar åt ett helt annat håll; det är mycket svårt att avgöra hur varje enskild situation bör hanteras för att inte bara skydda sig själv, men också andra. Väljer man att lägga ansvaret på grannar för att stoppa våld i hemmet måste alla boende där man implementerar Huskurage får adekvat utbildning i hur man på bästa sätt hanterar dessa situationer – samt att NUMMER ETT på listan bör vara att ringa polisen eftersom polisen trots allt är de mest professionella aktörerna inom området som bäst vet hur man bör hantera situationen.*